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INTRODUCTION 
  
Shadow economy is a total of economic operations and activities using inaccurate or 
illegal documents, which cannot be controlled by authorized public sector and not to taken 
into consideration of national income calculation. Also it can be named in the economic 
literature such as “Informal economy”, “Black Economy”, “Unregistered Economy”, 
“Underground Economy”, “Hidden economy”. 
In addition shadow economy has begun to be discussed in developed countries during 
1960s, spread swiftly after the fast globalization process in 1980s and has become a serious 
economic problem all over the world. The effect and size of the illegal economy depends not 
only on the degree of development, and also the economic and social structures of the 
countries.  
For that reason, the projects and studies to avoid the shadow economy and to take it 
under control can be different due to development degree for each country. Notwithstanding 
that it is propounded that the shadow economy has some positive aspects, but it is known 
mostly with the negative ones. 
The informal economy has some positive effects in short term, but the negative effects  
are discussed to be permanent in long term on the growth of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). Nevertheless, it causes unfair competition in official economy and leads to a decrease 
in tax revenues and an increase in deficit of the public finance. It also conceives 
inflationist effect.  
It is important to gather the right statistics and to make the correct estimation for the 
efficient fiscal and monetary policies. The formal and informal economy recently seem to be 
engaged. In this case different procedures must be used to estimate the size of the shadow 
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economy. According to the method used, the calculation may vary even for same period and 
country.  
In our study, first of all we try to explain the general causes of shadow economy from 
the viewpoint of the economic literature and public finance. After evaluating the potential 
advantages and disadvantages of shadow economy, the main methods for measuring the size 
of shadow economy are given. We also focus on the size of the shadow economy in two 
different countries such as Germany and United States of America. After analyzing the size of 
shadow economy in two case countries, the effects of shadow economy on their economic 
growth are measured and the comparison between the case countries is held.  
In first chapter, it is essential to understand how the shadow economy is defined. We 
also explain interaction with the official economy.  
In Second Chapter, we expressed the main causes of the shadow economy and outline 
several different approaches to measure the size of the shadow economy. In third Chapter, we 
use the common method named as “MIMIC Model Approach” and for calculation in our case 
countries. Afterwards, to analyze the effect of shadow economy on economic growth, we use 
the result the calculations in our regression model. 
In Last chapter, we finally compare the results which are found by MIMIC Model 
Approach in Germany and USA and conclude. 
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1. CHAPTER 
       LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1.1. Defining the Shadow Economy 
In economic literature there is a broad disagreement about definition of shadow 
economy. A definition of shadow economy, which is the one of the most widely used, is „... 
those economic activities and the income derived from them that circumvent or otherwise 
government regulation, taxation or observation.“1  
According to Fleming et al. it is feasible to distinguish the definition of shadow 
economy in two. First one is the definitional approach, which examines that it is a non-official 
activity. Thomas specifies that „covers those activities which...are not recorded the national 
income accounts.“2  Likewise Smith (1994) defines shadow economy as a „market-based 
production of goods and services, whether legal or illegal, that escapes detection in the 
official estimates of GDP.“ The second approach pronounced as behavioral approach 
underlines the relevance of institutional rules. It remarks that shadow economy is the reason 
of reaction by economic agents to institutional restriction. Feige informs that “The 
characteristics of each distinct informal economy are determined by the particular set of 
institutional rules that its members circumvent”3, and also Loayza expresses that informal 
economy is not regulated by the institutions of society to regulate the similar activities in 
official and social environment. 
                                                             
1 Roberto Dell’Anno, “Estimating the shadow economy in Italy: A structural equation approach”, Working 
Paper, Department of Economics, University of Aarhus, (2003),p. 4 
2Jim J. Thomas,”Quantifying the Black Economy: .Measurement Without Theory. Yet Again?”, The 
  Economic Journal, 109, no. 456 (June 1999).p.387 
3Matthew H. Fleming, John Roman, and Graham Farrell,” The Shadow Economy“,Journal of International 
Affairs,53, no. 2. , (Spring 2000), p. 390 
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 On the other hand, Tanzi specified in one of his paper that there are two definitions 
and measuring methods of shadow economy. One being national production or income that is 
missed by the statistical offices when they calculate the value of the national product, the 
other is revenue not reported to and not discovered by the tax authorities produced in 
underground activities. 4  According to his definition of shadow economy, in the first 
measuring method the country seems much more well off than the formal statistics (informs) 
indicates. In the second one, it is expressed that government obtains less revenue than it 
should. 
 Schneider (1986) defines shadow economy from another point of view as„ all 
economic activities that contribute to the value added and should be included in national 
income in terms of national accounting conventions but are presently not registered by 
national measurement agencies.“ Feige defines the differences between formal activity and 
shadow activity as „whether the activity adheres to the established, prevailing institutional 
rules of the game.. adherence to the established rules constitutes participation in the formal 
economy. Whereas noncompliance or circumvention of the established rules constitutes 
participation in the informal economy.“5 On Table 1 it may be helpful to describe what illegal 
activities are and their differences from the legal activities. 
Table 1.1. The Definition Form of Shadow Economy
 
                                                             
4 Vito Tanzi,” Defining and Estimating Underground and Informal Economies: The New Institutional 
Economics Approach”, The economic Journal (1994), p.344 
5 Edgar L. Feige, .Defining and Estimating Underground and Informal 
Economies: The New Institutional Economics Approach,. World Development, 18, no. 7 
(1990)  
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Source: Lippert and Walker, The Underground Economy: Global Evidence of its Size and Impact. Vancouver, 
B.C., The Frazer Institute, 1997. 
 
 As is seen on the table 1, the contents of the shadow economy cover unreported 
income related to legal activities and services, either from monetary or barter transactions, 
therefore the all economic activities were announced to the tax authorities. 
 Furthermore, there are various reasons why the authorities should be concerned about 
rising of the shadow economy. The highly important ones are denoted as; 
i. A rise in shadow economy might be seen as a reaction of economic agents and 
individuals to a restriction by state or government and therefore they may choose not 
to report their incomes. And if the increase of the shadow economy is caused by the 
gross tax and social security burdens, then the “consecutive flight” makes tax and 
social security worse. As a result, there may be an increase in budget deficit, and a 
growth in shadow economy. 
ii. A growing or booming shadow economy may cause various difficulties for policy 
makers, since the formal indicators like on unemployment, labor force, income are 
uncertain.  
iii. The effects of a growing shadow economy on the official economy must be analyzed. 
From one point of view a booming shadow economy may be attractive to workers of 
the informal economy and create a competition with the official firms. On the other 
side, at least two-third of income earned in informal economy is directly spent in 
official economy, therefore it also has a positive effect on official economy.  
 
Harding and Jenkins (1989) order the activities of shadow economy under three 
criteria as political, social and economic. The political criteria are divided three subgroups. 1)  
administrative relation; 2)unofficial activities; 3)national statistics. In spite of the political 
aspects that affect shadow economy, the economic criteria are most used criteria to define and 
analyze the shadow economy. The principle criteria are: 1) labor situation; 2) tax avoidance; 
3) size of the activity; 4) professional position; 5) administration of the activities; 6)national 
accounts. The last criteria used are the social dividing. These are: 1) social relationships; 2) 
autonomy and flexibility; 3) survival of the activity. Despite of theoretic view, there are some 
differences when it comes to empirical outlooks. For instance, political criteria to define the 
shadow economy are used in developing countries less than developed countries.  
11 
 
Illegal activities attain a new point on the process when illegal labor force is entailed 
either in working in a second job or including illegal employment. In that respect government 
reaction through regulations turns strongly marked as illegality has changed its fields and shift 
from the product market to the more exquisite labor markets and penalties might become 
heavier than before. The negative end of continuum for which the symbol of black economy 
is used, includes activities which are explicitly banned and prosecuted by the government, 
such as organized crime, drug dealing, trafficking of human beings, prostitution and illegal 
arms dealing i.e. activities which seriously undermine the legitimacy of the state institutions 
and which may even put the survival of the state in question.6 
 The starting points of nearly all controversies are different estimates of the size of the 
shadow economy which makes the assessment of the validity of the finding really hard.  
Another point to specify is that empirical studies occur measuring the size and 
development of shadow economy, the causes and consequences of shadow economy are 
derived from theoretically should be confirmed by these methods.  
Various ideological preferences influence often the discussion about sufficient 
economic policies. One can happen upon opposing ranging from a compulsory denial of the 
fact shadow economy to inventive exaggerations of its size and impact. The initial points of 
approximately all controversies are various estimates of the size of the shadow economy that 
the validity of the finding assesses really hard.  
 
1.2. The Interaction between official and unofficial economy 
 
There exist three well-known schools to determine the linkage between official and 
unofficial economy. These are; the dualists, the legalists and the structuralists. The views of 
these three schools can be defined as below; 
Dualists explain the unofficial economy as a totally separate unofficial sector; what 
means the unofficial economy is not directly linked to the official one. They argue that the 
informal sector appears because of the failure of the economic growth and industrialization. 
                                                             
6 Belev,Boyan,“ The Informal Economy in Central and Eastern Europe – Obstacle to European Integration or Bridge 
Between the EU Member States and the Accession Countries?” THE INFORMAL ECONOMY IN THE EU ACCESSION 
COUNTRIES Size, Scope, Trends and Challenges to the Process of EU Enlargement, p.5 
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Legalists view the unofficial work arrangements (or the unregistered businesses) as a 
rational response to over-regulation by bureaucracies. For their argument, those who run 
informal businesses do that to reduce their own costs of production. 
The structuralists view the unofficial economy as being subordinated to the official 
economy. For their opinion, the privileged capitalists of the official economy seek to erode 
the employment relations and subordinate those who work in the unofficial sector in order to 
reduce the production costs and increase their competitiveness. 
What differs between of these schools is their underlying model of power or power 
relationships. The dualists defend the notion that there are few power relationships between 
those who work in the official and the unofficial economies. The legalists defend the notion 
that unofficial entrepreneurs exercise their own power – or choice – to operate unofficially as 
a response to unreasonable bureaucratic controls.  The structuralists defend the notion that the 
official economy exerts a dominant power relationship over the unofficial economy in its own 
interests. The other observers would argue for a comprehensive framework that recognizes 
that the linkages and power relationships between the unofficial economy, official sector, and 
the public sector differs by which segment of the unofficial economy one is talking about. To 
illustrate, street vendors often have to vend informally because they are not incorporated in 
existing regulatory frameworks or because existing regulatory frameworks are too punitive or 
constraining. Industrial outworkers typically have little bargaining power with those who put 
out work to them. And self-employed garment makers often have relatively little market 
knowledge, market access, or bargaining power compared to large garment manufacturers. 
The interaction between official and unofficial economy seems to take a significant 
part in daily life e.g a citizen working unofficially and buying taxed commodities or exactly 
the opposite; a citizen working officially and buying non-taxed commodities. By non-taxed 
transactions, buyers and seller s share the deferred tax of the market and form the contumacy 
against the government. As a result, we see the table below; 
Loss of taxes→ Debt for requirement of public expenditures→ High interest rates 
caused by debts→ Public deficit→ Inflation 
The unofficial economy starts to damage the official economy by absorbing it. We 
classify the connection between unofficial and official economy in three groups: 
1. Direct and indirect; backward and forward production linkage 
2. Consumption linkage 
13 
 
3. Technological linkage 
Backward links are formed in raw material and machinery supply from official and 
unofficial economy. Forward links are emerged in use of informal productions as inputs in 
official economy. Consumption links indicate the direct connections established with the final 
consumers. Technological links are constituted with the labor force improving material and 
technological information transactions from official to unofficial economy.7 
Healing of the international shipping and growth of the global trading volume eased the 
work of the crime organizations in the global area and there has been a huge increase in the 
trading of the prohibited goods.  Although advances in the communication technology eased 
the shifting of individuals, companies and financial instruments quickly, sometimes even 
without transactions costs, improved the global economy. But it has also caused a huge 
increase in the unofficial economy. For example, even with a phone call, a money launderer 
would get into the stock market. The principle of confidential banking eases the work of the 
money launderer in getting into official economy. 
According to Ranis and Stewart (1999), the modern informal and formal sectors are 
complementary on the producer market: the formal sector is a destination of modern informal 
output through direct sales and outsourcing. In this framework, the growth of the modern 
segment of the informal sector is positively related to the growth of the formal sector due to 
production linkages between the two. Pieters, Moreno- Monroy and Erumban (2011) argue 
that Indian manufacturing sector gives an exact example to show the linkage between formal 
and informal economy. In India accounting of about 80% of the employment and 20 percent 
of value added in manufacturing in 2005 and 2006. Labor regulation is an important feature in 
the Indian economy and it has been associated with lower manufacturing output and 
employment ad higher informal manufacturing output. However, also outsourcing has been 
described as for firms in formal economy to cut the costs.8 
Fraudulency, an element of unofficial economy also shapes by the official economy. It is 
estimated that the income of the fraudulent activities to be 512 million dollars, and it figures 
7% of the global economy. In developed countries, e.g in USA; the counterfeit product trade 
was estimated as 34 billion dollars in NYC and the effect of this amount on loss of taxes was 
1.6 billion dollars in 2003. In CEE Countries, e.g in Romania; The National Statistics Institute 
                                                             
7 Kerem Kaptangil, ‘Kayitdisi Ekonomi ve Turkiye’, ( Unpublished Master Thesis, Abant Izzet Baysal 
University) 2003, p: 8 
8 Pieters, Moreno-Monroy, Erumban ‘’Formal-Informal Production Linkages and Informal Sector Heterogeneity: 
Evidence From Indian Manufacturing’’; Unıversity of Groeningen; 2011:4 
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estimates the value of hidden economy at approximately 20 billion Euros annually taking into 
consideration only black labor, the TVA fraud and the domestic industry, the weight being 
held by the first two.9 The average size of the informal economy, as a percent of official GNI 
in the year 2000, in developing countries is 41%, in transition countries 38% and in OECD 
countries 18%.10 
The unofficial economy may occur due to the social, legal, moral and cultural differences 
of different economic systems of the countries. Regardless, countries apply different methods 
to prevent unofficial economy and reduce it to an acceptable level. 
Measurement of shadow economy is a difficult issue to research because of the lack of 
definition and emerging reasons. The result of studies for the same country using different 
methods, may even differ for a certain period. Though the differences between countries, it is 
possible to get an idea about the dimensions of the shadow economy.  
The studies that were made to determine the interaction between informal activities and 
economic growth obtained similar results. Giles (1997) surveyed the relationship between 
registered and unregistered economic activities in New Zealand. As a result of Granger 
Causality Test, he obtained the findings of a causal relation as business cycles in both 
economies. Giles, Tedds and Werkneh (1999) made the Granger Causality Test to investigate 
the interaction between both economies in Canada and they found out that there is a causality 
relation registered towards unregistered economy. Although there is not a deal that 
unregistered economy affects the registered economy negatively or positively in the literature, 
while some analysts found out that informality has a negative effect on economic growth. 
Others’ findings are quite opposite. It is submitted that while the informal economy rises by 
1%, the formal economy decreases around 5%. In developing countries, that shows us a 
presence of negative relationship. On the other hand, some studies prove that while the 
informal economy rises by 1%, the formal economy increases between 8% and 10% in 
developed countries; this also shows us the presence of the positive relationship between the 
formal and the informal economy11.  
                                                             
9 Criveanu Maria; Mihai Magdalena, ‘‘Methods used for treating the underground economy in Romania’’, 
University of Craiova, Faculty of Economy and Business Administration, Craiova, A.I.Cuza nr.13, 1997 
10 Friedrich Schneider, ‘‘ Size and The Measurement of Informal Economy in 110 Countries Around The 
World’’, July 2002,p.12 
11 Sukru Kizilot ve  safak Ertan Comakli(2004), “Vergi Kayıp ve Kaçaklarının Kayıtdışı Ekonomi  İlişkisi ve 
Boyutlarının Mevzuat Açısından Değerlendirilmesi”, 19. Maliye Sempozyumu, Türkiye’de Vergi Kayıp ve 
Kaçakları ve  Önlenmesi Yolları, Uludağ Üniversitesi  İktisadi ve  İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Yayını,(2004), pp.115 
vd. 
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Estimates of the aggregate shadow economies of different countries vary widely. The 
empirical studies in Austria and Germany prove that the 60% of gains from the formal sector 
is spent on the informal sector and these results show us that the informal economy has a 
significant impact on the formal economy. Results in United Kingdom show that the shadow 
economy triggers off the consumption significantly. Similarly, in Peru 35% of the wealth 
comes out from the shadow economy12.  
Adam and Ginsburg (1985) focus on the implications of the shadow economy on official 
growth in Belgium and due to the empirical results; they found out that the shadow economy 
has a positive effect on the registered economy.13 The shadow economies of Thailand, Nigeria 
and, and Egypt amount to about 70% of their respective GDP. Similarly, the shadow 
economies of Latin American emerging economies such as Guatemala, Panama and Mexico 
amount to 40 to 60% of their respective GDP. The shadow economies of South Asian 
emerging economies such as Philippines, Malaysia and South Korea amount to 30 to 50% of 
their respective GDP. In OECD countries the result changes between amounts to 8 to 30% of 
their respective GDP. 14 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
12 Cetintas & Vergil, Estimation of Underground Economy in Turkey’, Journal of Dogus University, 4 (1), 
2003:19 
13 Adam M.C. ve Victor A. Ginsburgh (1985), “The Effects of Irregular Markets on Macroeconomics Policy: 
Some Estimates for Belguim”,  European Economic Review Vol.29 No.1 ss.15-33. 
14 Brian K. Edwards & Silvio J. Flaim, ‘Measuring and Integrating The Shadow Economy: A Sector- Specific 
Approach’, Los Alamos National Laboratory, June 30, 2008 
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2. CHAPTER  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1.    The Main Causes of Determining the Shadow Economy 
 Nowadays, one of the main problems in developed and developing countries is the 
reasons of the emergence of the shadow economy, which based on very complex in some 
cases. In this study we will try to explain the reasons and determinants of shadow economy 
under different categories. 
 
2.1.1.    Economic Reasons 
2.1.1.1. Inequitable Distribution of National Income 
 
 In developing countries there is quite an inequitable distribution of income. And this 
situation may be used as a tool for financing of development by the administration of share of 
income and also may cause instability in the economy. As known, providing the economic 
growth is one of the goals of the economic policy. Applied economic policy tools may affect 
the share of income inadequately in order to accomplish this goal. In addition, with the 
inadequate share of national income would cause an increase in shadow economic activities in 
the lowest income group of individuals. 
 Another problem observed in developing countries is that the income of employees of 
public sector remains very low when it is compared with other sectors. This situation leads the 
employee of public sector to work in a second even a third job. The situation increases the 
informal economic activities. 
 
2.1.1.2. Aim of reducing the Production Costs 
The main purpose of the enterprises which act economic is to provide the cheapest 
production. In order to accomplish this, they attempt to provide the input from the cheapest 
sources. Especially, the unemployment in the developing countries cause that the individuals 
17 
 
are willing to work without any social security in informal sector. Therefore, enterprises try to 
provide the labor and other instruments of production from the informal sector to reduce the 
costs of production. 
Furthermore, in some sectors the supply of labor is subject to a certain restriction that 
actualizes covertly. The reason of this situation is either the lack of competition in the labor 
market or a restriction for some work entrance. In this case, the employees in the relevant 
sectors gain higher incomes.15 
 
2.1.1.3. High Inflation 
 
Particularly starting from the 1970s the high increases in oil prices has led to an 
increase in the level of prices. Under the inflation effect the individuals tried to adapt the 
working conditions of their contracts among them, therefore, the contract details are kept 
confidential. Hiding or incomplete reporting of financial transactions from the state shows the 
growth in the shadow economic transactions.  
 
2.1.2 Fiscal Reasons 
2.1.2.1 Increase in Taxes  
 
The existence of taxes did not cause shadow economic activities when the taxes were 
connected with reasonable and substantially visible activities or taxes contain also the poll 
taxes. Nevertheless, such as contemporary states, taxes came to be heavier than before, 
taxpayers tried to avoid from the high taxes by showing their activities in the shadow. 
Therefore, a kind of developed between taxpayers and the tax administrators that had to work 
harder to make the taxpayers comply with their tax obligations.16 Higher tax levels and rates 
increased the efforts of taxpayers to avoid it. 
Moreover, as seen severe studies, an increase in burden of social security cause a 
growth in the shadow economic activities.  Due to a strong influence of the fiscal intervention 
                                                             
15 Bruno Dallao, The Informal Economy, The Underground Economy and the Black Labour Market , England,   
1990,p.100 
16 Vito Tanzi, The Shadow Economy, Its Causes and Its Consequences,  Brazilian Institute of Ethics in 
Competition ( 12 March 2002),p.3 
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on cost-benefit choices individuals choose to shift their official economic activities to the 
shadow economy because of the increasing the opportunity cost and it reduces the 
productivity of the official work.17  Since the difference between total cost of labor in the 
official economy and after tax earnings from work come to be larger, the reason working in 
the shadow economy also grows. Nevertheless, the tax reforms such a deduction in the tax 
rate may make stable the size of the shadow economy but not lead to an important decrease in 
the shadow economy.  
 
Source: Schneider and Hametner (2007) 
Figure 2.1: Main causes for the increase of shadow economic activities 
Figure 1 explains that the tax and social burden responsibilities of individuals have an 
important influence on the size and development of the shadow economy. A strong effect of 
indirect and direct taxation on the shadow economy is pointed out by statistical evidence in 
further studies. (Schneider and Hametner, 2007)  
 
2.1.2.2. Regulations 
  
Regulations are substantial tools for governmental economic policy. And it often takes 
a place of taxing and public spending to obtain particular governmental function. The 
economic activities of individuals and companies are connected with several areas by the 
government. Some of the regulations which include for instance minimum wages, pension 
contributions or vacation time etc. raise the cost of operating in some services or make it 
                                                             
17 Friedrich Schneider, “The Shadow Economies in Central and SouthAmerica with a Specific Focus on Brazil 
and Columbia: What do we know?”,2008, p.5 
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difficult to work formally in them. Consequently, many activities are shifted to shadow 
activities to avoid consenting to these regulations and to evade from paying taxes. 
 Countries that have many rigid regulations- that are overregulated- tend to have large 
shadow economies. Rankings of countries on the ground of the use of “red tape” or 
“bureaucratic constraints” has occasionally placed Brazil among the more regulated countries, 
thus creating stronger incentives for enterprises and individuals in Brazil to operate 
underground or in the shadow.18 
In order to observe the intensity of regulations the administrations set laws and 
procedures such as license requirements or trade barriers, labor market regulations for foreign 
workers and companies. Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobatòn have shown there is 
empirical evidence that the influence of labor market regulations is significant on shadow 
economy. Regulations cause an important increase of labor costs in the formal economy. 
When it starts the costs of labor to be shifted to the workers or employees, they choose an 
alternative work in the shadow economy, where they can evade from these costs. Johnson, 
Kaufmann, and Schleifer (1997) discussed in their paper the relationship between regulations 
and unofficial economy. Empirical analysis resulted that the economies which have relatively 
fair taxes, light regulations and high tax revenues in the formal sector have a lower share of 
the shadow economy in GDP than the economies that have low tax collection, unfair taxes 
and relatively poor public goods.  
The Heritage foundation measures the intensity of regulation on a scale of 1 to 5 for 
countries. The table shows one point increase in this index is associated with an 14.7 
percentage point increase in the share of the shadow economy.19 As a result governments 
should underscore more on implementation of laws and regulations rather than increase the 
number of laws. On the other hand some administrations prefer still more regulations and 
laws, because it causes a higher rate of employment in the public sector.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
18 Tanzi, loc. cit, p.8 
19Simon Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, Corruption, Public Finances 
and the Unofficial Economy, MIT, The World Bank, The World Bank (1998),p. 18 
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2.1.3. Public Sector Services 
 
An expansion in the shadow economy can cause to reduced state revenues which in 
turn decrease the quality and quantity of publicly contributed goods and services. 
Fundamentally, this can lead to an increase in the tax rates for firms and individuals in the 
formal sector, pretty often combined with a disintegration in the quality of the public goods 
(such as the infrastructure) and of the management, with the outcome of even robust 
incentives to join in the shadow economy. Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobatón (1998a/b) 
present a simple model of this connection. Their results show that smaller shadow economies 
appear in countries with higher tax revenues if obtained by lower tax rates, fewer laws and 
reglements and less bribery facing enterprises.  
Countries with a better rule of law, which is financed by tax revenues, also have 
smaller shadow economies. Transition countries have higher levels of regulation leading to a 
significantly higher incidence of bribery, higher effective taxes on official activities and a 
large discretionary framework of regulations and consequently a higher shadow economy. 
The general conclusion is that "wealthier countries of the OECD, as well as some in Eastern 
Europe, find themselves in the ‘good equilibrium’ of relatively low tax and regulatory burden, 
sizeable revenue mobilization, good rule of law and corruption control, and a smaller 
unofficial economy. By contrast, a number of countries in Latin American and the former 
Soviet Union exhibit characteristics consistent with a ‘bad equilibrium’: tax and regulatory 
discretion and burden on the firm are high, the rule of law is weak, and there is a high 
incidence of bribery and a relatively high share of activities in the unofficial economy."20   
 
2.1.4. Changes in individual values and general attitude towards shadow economic 
activity 
 
                                                             
20 Simon Johnson; Daniel Kauffman and Pablo Zoido-Lobatón, ‘Corruption, public finances and the  
unofficial economy’ Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, Discussion Paper,(1998b) p:1 
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In a „civilized” society, politicians concern in the economy in order to “fix” the 
boundaries between legality and illegality and to govern the working of economic life. These 
involvements may not be appropriate to everybody’s’ idea of morality and grasp of justice. 
This means, people do not oppose towards „normal“ shadow economic activities; people 
commonly may find it better to justify their unofficial supply or demand for goods and 
services because friends and family members just “do the same” . The term „changes in 
individual values “generally consists of all possible changes in morality of a certain group or 
a whole country’s population relating to their agreeableness to accept state reglements.21 In 
general, if trust of the public authorities is high dealing with their actions and if the population 
shows a positive action towards fiscal interferences, one normally expects lower shadow 
economic activities22.  For example a change in individual values may occur, when taxpayers 
believe that they no longer receive enough social services or benefits for the revenues paid to 
the government. Such events may decrease the agreement and the confidence in public 
authorities and increase the incentive to commit in the shadow economy, partly because in 
such situations people may need to balance subjectively felt individual welfare losses out 
themselves.  
 
2.1.5. Changes in labor market conditions and the employment system 
 
A rationing (i.e. strong policy interference) on the official labor market, e.g. decrease of 
working hours per week, or a decrease of the age for retirement have the effect that people 
have much more time to  be used for shadow economic activities. An economic crisis may 
also lead to a decrease of the work force needed in the official labor market; hence it is 
frequent that during recessions the official demanding of work force decreases and 
unemployment increases. However, it is not normal that during the worldwide recession in the 
70s a general increase in the extent of shadow economic activity was observed.23 
An increase in transfers (e.g. unemployment benefits, pensions, etc.) reduces the 
incentives to work in the official economy as well. As a result, people have willingness to 
                                                             
21 F. Haslinger, Illoyalität und die Ausbreitung der Untergrundwirtschaft – Eine theoretische Analyse; in  
Gijsel, P. (Ed.):  Schattenwirtschaft und alternative Ökonomie: Eine Herausforderung für die politische 
Ökonomie?; Regensburg: Transfer Verlag, (1984) 
22 Kirchgässner,Steuermoral und Schwarzarbeit; in Enste, H. D., Schneider, F. (Ed.):  Jahrbuch 
Schattenwirtschaft 2006/2007; Berlin: LIT Verlag, (2006) 
23 Peter De Gijsel, ‚Schattenwirtschaft und alternative Ökonomie : e. polit. Herausforderung für d. polit. 
Ökonomie?‘ (1984) 
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work less in the official economy and as a result that may increase their shadow economic 
activities. Another encouragement for working in the shadow economy is an increase in the 
wage rate in the informal sector (e.g. caused by higher demand for unlawful work) as this 
increases the profitability of unlawful work relative to employment in the formal sector. To 
some extent, a decrease in the net wage rate in the formal economy (e.g.  Due to an increase 
in payroll tax) decreases the profitability of work in the official economy or the marginal 
utility of the expansion in formal work time which may also cause to an increase of shadow 
economic activity. Besides, this discussion is only valid for considerations on a 
microeconomic basis. According to macroeconomic theory, lower wages lead to higher 
employment as demand for labor increases and lower unemployment implicates, ceteris 
paribus, lower activity in the shadow economy.24 
 
2.1.6. Prohibitions  
 
Some activities are prohibited in some countries while they may be allowed in others. 
Prostitution is a classic example. Prohibitions are special forms of disposition so that they 
could also be classified together with the category of regulation. They play an important role 
in pushing people and resources off the formal economic track. There are some operations 
that are forbidden so that those who engage in them are engaging in unlawful or even criminal 
activities. They do so because, often, the outputs of these operations are in great demand so 
that high profits can be made. In a private cost benefit evaluation, those who engage in them 
determine that the benefits in the form of potential high gains exceeding the costs that include 
the possibility of being caught and being sentenced. Major forms of these activities are the 
production and distribution of drugs, engaging in illegal gambling, lending of money at high 
return rates, the production and sale of dangerous or forbidden substances various services, 
including prostitution, and others.  
Reported estimates of the earnings in these prohibited activities are enormous.  There 
is some disagreement among statisticians and other experts on whether the proceeds of these 
activities, or at least of some of them, ought to be counted toward the estimates of national 
incomes. Some argue that as long as people demand these “services” and are willing to pay 
                                                             
24 G. Kirchgässner, Steuermoral und Schwarzarbeit; in Enste, H. D., Schneider, F. (Ed.):  Jahrbuch 
Schattenwirtschaft 2006/2007; Berlin: LIT Verlag (2006) 
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for them, they ought to be counted. Others disagree. One difficulty is that some countries 
allow at least some of them, while others forbid them. For example Germany allows 
prostitution and the German tax authorities expect prostitutes to report fully their “incomes” 
and pay taxes on them. The Netherlands allows the sales and the consumption of some drugs 
that are illegal elsewhere. In both of these countries those activities are counted in the 
countries’ national incomes. Thus, important questions are raised by prohibition and criminal 
activities for the definition and the measurement of the shadow economy. Because of the 
large estimates of these activities, their inclusion or exclusion can make a significant 
difference to that measurement.25  
 
2.2. Methods of Estimating the Shadow Economy 
 
Table 2.1. The Estimating Methods 
Direct Approaches 1. Survey Approach 
2. Integrated Approach 
3. Tax Audit and Investigation 
Approach 
Indirect Approaches 
 
         
           
            Physical Output Approaches 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             Monetary Approaches 
1. Comparison of the size of GNP 
calculated with different 
approaches 
2. Employment Approach 
 
3. Electricity Consumption Approach 
 
a. Basic Electricity Consumption 
Approach 
b. Revised-Electricity 
Consumption Approach 
c. Integrated-Electricity 
Consumption Approach 
 
                                                             
25 Vito Tanzi, ‘The Shadow Economy, Its Causes and Its Consequences‘,  (1999), p:13 
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4. Basic Monetary Rate Approach 
5. Trading Volume Approach 
6. Currency Demand Approach 
7. MIMIC Approach 
 
 
 
2.2.1 Direct Approaches 
 
These approaches are also mentioned as ‘micro approaches’. Surveys have been used 
in many studies. But it has a big disadvantage of the reliability of the respondents’ answers. If 
respondent answers the questions honestly, the survey would yield reliable determinations. 
This method can surrender enumerated information about underground economy when 
detailed questions are answered correctly. That is the most important advantage in favor of 
the direct method.  Underground economy can be estimated by comparing the declared 
income for tax purpose and measured income by bills or checks.  The analyst aims to 
calculate unofficial economy by getting the amount of undeclared taxable income. But as it 
can be thought, to obtain correct or reliable data for undeclared taxable income is not a frugal 
task. Since, in general, auditing compliance initiatives are not random but based on 
characteristics of filed tax returns, such a sample is not necessarily random and therefore is 
not representative of the whole population. This factor is likely to bias compliance–based 
estimates of the shadow economy. Secondly, estimates based on tax audits reflect that portion 
of shadow economy income that the authorities succeeded in discovering and this is likely to 
be only a fraction of total hidden income.26 
 
2.2.2.   Indirect Approaches 
 
2.2.2.1. Comparison of the size of GNP calculated with different approaches 
 
In national reports the income measure of GNP and the expenditure measure of GNP 
should be equal. Thus, in case of a difference, the gap between expenditure and the income 
                                                             
26 C. Bajada;F. Schneider, ‘Size, causes and consequences of the underground economy: an international 
perspective‘,Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2005, p:76 
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measure can show the evidence to the existence of the shadow economy. If all the constituents 
of the expenditure were rightly measured, then this approach would in fact capitulate a good 
estimate of the size of the shadow economy. These estimates may therefore be very crude and 
of questionable reliability.27 
 
 
2.2.2.2. Employment Approach 
 
 This approach studies the differences between the registered unemployment and the 
labor force. A decline in labor force participation in the official economy can be seen as an 
indication of increased activity in the underground economy, if total labor force participation 
is assumed constant.28 The disadvantage of this approach is that dissimilarities in the rate of 
participation may also have other causes. In addition, people can have a second job in the 
unofficial economy and a ‘real’ job in the ‘official’ economy. Therefore such estimates may 
be viewed as weak indicators of the size and development of the unofficial economy.  
 
2.2.2.3. Electricity Consumption Approach 
 
The physical output approach firstly was used by Lizzeri (1979), and then del Boca 
and Francesco (1982), Portes (1996) and Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996). Electricity 
consumption or Kaufmann- Kaliberda approach as well, th shadow economy is the difference 
between the rate of the electricity consumption and the rate of official GDP. Moreover, this 
method has been criticized as;  
- Not all shadow economy activities require electricity, the other energy sources can be 
used as well. 
- Technological changes have made the production and the use of the electricity more 
efficient. 
                                                             
27 C. Bajada, F. Schneider, ‘Size, causes and consequences of the underground economy: an international 
perspective‘,Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2005, p:82 
28Park No-Wook, ‘Underground economy: Size and Causes’, Korea Institute of Public Finance, (2005) 
 
26 
 
- The changes in the electricity/GDP electricity may differ over time and across 
countries.29 
 
2.2.2.4 The Monetary Approach 
 
Associating between shadow economy and development in monetary aggregates the 
monetary approach tries to estimate the size of the shadow economy. Since the shadow 
economic transactions is suitable for concealing and abducting from the inspection; in general 
it is assumed that the payments are made with cash and these activities affect the size of the 
monetary aggregates. By analysis of these effects the size of the shadow economy is tried to 
be estimated.  The monetary approaches can be classified under three main titles: 
 
2.2.2.4.1 Basic monetary  Approach  
 
In this approach is considered in order to identify the size of the shadow economy the 
assumption following the activities in money market and using only the cash to make all 
transaction payments in shadow economic activities. Moreover, in official economy is 
assumed that the ratio of circulation of money and total deposits remain constant. An increase 
in this ratio over time indicates that there is an increase in demand of currency and thus 
shadow economy increases. 
It is admitted that the changes in the ratio of the total amount of money in circulation 
(C) to total deposit (D) due to changes in shadow economy and the rise of this ratio causes 
increasing in the shadow economy. In the simple monetary ratio the informal income is 
calculated based on the following formula: 
 
YH = [YR (C – kR D)]/[( kR +1)D] 
 
where YH denotes informal GDP, YR is recorded GDP, C is currency in circulation, D 
is current deposit, k is the ratio of C/D.  
                                                             
29G.L. Miriela and Lennie Pa, ‘The Shadow Economy in the Netherlands Antilles ‘, Social and Economic 
Studies, Vol. 56: 4, December 2007, Special Issue on  Crisis, Chaos and Change, p: 1 
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The assumption of this method is that the income-velocity of circulation (Y /C + D), 
v, is equal to registered and shadow economies. As a result of this the size of the shadow 
economy is v times extra currency. The base year considered the size of the shadow economy 
is zero might be indicated the lowest value of the ratio kR. 
 
2.2.2.4.2. Transactions Approach  
 
This method was developed by Feige (1979). Feige presumed that there is constant 
ratio between official GDP and trading volume. This method is based on Fisher’s quantity 
theory of money.  
        MT=pT, where M denotes amount of money, V is velocity of currency, p is prices, T is 
total transactions.  
Relating total nominal GNP to total transactions, the GNP of the shadow economy is 
calculated by subtracting official GNP from total nominal GNP. However, Feige has to 
assume a base year in which there is no shadow economy, and therefore the ratio of pT to 
total nominal (official = total) GNP was normal.30 
 
 
2.2.2.4.3. Currency Demand Approach 
 
This approach was first used by Cagan, who examined correlation between currency 
demand and U.S. tax pressure among the period 1919-1955. In this method it is assumed that 
currency/ current deposit ratio is remained over time. A proportional increase in the amount 
of the currency relatively to the current deposit is deemed a sign of increasing in shadow 
economic activities.  
This method is extended by Gutman(1972) based on Cagan(1958).  Gutman method’s 
is based on four key assumptions: 
- High taxes and government regulation,  
- Only cash is used to make transactions in the shadow economy, 
                                                             
30 Scheneider,F and Enste, “Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences“, p.93 
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- The ratio of currency to demand deposits (C/D), only influenced by changes in taxes   
and regulations and, 
- There was some point in time in the past when no shadow economy existed.31 
Increase the size of the economy cause an increase the demand for currency. In order 
to isolate this consequent increment demand for currency an equation for demand is observed. 
Furthermore, variables, like direct and indirect tax burden, government regulation and 
complexity of tax system, which are deemed the main cause working in the shadow economy, 
are counted in the estimation equation.  
Cagan’s approach was developed in order to estimate the shadow economic activities 
by Tanzi (1980). He calculated a currency demand function for the U.S. this approach 
presumes that the transactions in shadow economy are paid in the procedure of cash payment 
not to leave any traces for the authorities. Also such as the growth in revenue, the habits of 
consumption, interest rate are considered in this method. Furthermore the main reasons to 
force people working in the shadow economy such as direct or indirect tax burden; 
government regulations and complexity of tax system are included to the equation.  The basic 
regression model for currency demand by Tanzi(1983) is following: 
 
and in this model should be provided β1>0, β2>0, β3<0, β4>0 and ln is natural logarithm.  
C /M2 : is the ratio of cash holdings to current and deposit accounts. 
TW : is a weighted average tax rate (to proxy changes in the size of the shadow economy) 
WS /Y : is a proportion of wages and salaries in national income (to capture changing payment 
and money holding patterns) 
 R: is the interest paid on savings deposits (to capture the opportunity cost of holding cash) 
Y/N: is the per capita income. 
 Extreme increases in currency of demand, increasing tax burden and other reasons 
push the individuals to informal economy. The size and development of the shadow economy 
is initially calculated by comparison between the currency demand corresponding to the 
lowest value of direct and indirect tax burden and currency demand corresponding to the 
current tax burden. Assuming the income- velocity of currency of circulation is the same for 
                                                             
31 Ahumada, H., Alvaredo, F., Canavese, A. J.,” The Demand for Currency Approach and the size of the shadow economy: a 
critical assessment”,p.6 
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the recorded and shadow economy; the shadow economy can be calculated and compared 
with the official GDP.  
 All monetary approaches use the standard quantity theory to measure the size of the 
shadow economy. It is explained with the equation of the quantity theory MV=Y, where M 
denotes money supply, V is velocity of money and Y is the nominal national income. 
VH= VR= V   
VH is the velocity of currency in shadow economy; VR is the velocity of currency in 
official economy. 
MH VH=YH       
YH is the amount of income created by the shadow economy; MH is the amount of 
currency held in shadow economy. 
Through the equations above total income in the shadow economy can be calculated. 
According to Cagan(1958), one of the basic determinants of the ratio of the currency demand 
to total money supply is the tax burden behind the shadow economy. Consequently, the cash 
holding money is used as the basic variable to determine the size of the shadow economy. In 
the literature of currency demand there are many variables such as tax burden, interest rate, 
inflation, exchange rate etc. 
The increment increase in currency, which is the amount unexplained by the 
conventional or normal factors mentioned is then attributed to the rising tax burden and other 
reasons leading people to work in the shadow economy.32  
Currency demand approach is one of the most commonly used methods. According to 
Schneider the approach that has been used in many OECD countries has different aspects to 
the critics are following: 
- Not all transactions in the unofficial economy are paid in cash. Some studies seek 
the method to attain whether all transaction in the shadow economy were paid in 
cash or not. The findings of Isachsen and Strom (1985) showed that in Norway, in 
1980, approximately 80% of all transactions included paid in cash.  
- Most studies regards only tax burden as main factor of the shadow economy. 
Because of the unreliable data for most countries other studies are not attended. If, 
                                                             
32  Schneider,F.,”The size and development of the shadow economies and shadow economy labor force of 22 transition and 
21 OECD countries: what do we know?” p. 48 
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since it appears possible, these other factors also influence the size of the shadow 
economy then it can be higher than stated in most studies.  
- When this approach is applied at least to the United States, Garcia (1978), 
Park(1979) and Feige (1996) elicited a another weak point is that increases in cash/ 
current deposit is derived from the reduction in current deposit caused by informal 
economic activities rather than an increase in the cash.  
- Another weak point of transactions, as in most studies, is to assume the currency-
velocity of circulation is the same. As Hill and Kabir (1996), in Canada,  and 
Klovland (1984),in Nordic countries, claimed, there is significantly uncertainty 
about the velocity of money in formal economy and the velocity of money in 
shadow economy is even more difficult to estimate. 
- Lastly, the assumption of the no shadow economy in base year opened to critism. 
 
2.2.2.5. Structural Equation Models 
 
The structural equation models (SEM) became very popular in some sub-disciplines of 
Business Administration. The terms, "unmeasured variable models" and "latent variable 
models" refer to types of structural equation models that explicitly incorporate measurement 
error into the estimation of structural equation parameters, and treat observed (“manifest”) 
variables as indicators of underlying constructs rather than perfectly measured representations 
of these same constructs.33   
The Structural Equation Models (SEM) are statistical relationships among latent 
(unobserved) and manifest (observed) variables. It implies a structure of the empirical 
covariance matrix which, once the parameters have been estimated, can be compared to the 
resulting model-implied covariance matrix. If both matrices are consistent, then the structural 
equation model can be considered as a likely explanation for the relations among the 
examined variables. The structural equation models are “regression equations with less 
restrictive assumptions that allow measurement error in the explanatory as well as the 
dependent variables”. So the method is theoretically  superior than regression analysis as it 
explores all information contained in the covariance matrix and not only in the variance, and 
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also because it allows variables to be measured with error, but  compared with regression and 
factor analysis, SEM is a relatively unknown tool in economics34.   
LISREL is one of the many computer programs now available to estimate SEM models.  
It is common in general structural equation models such as the peer-inﬂuences model to 
distinguish between 
two sub-models as; 
1. A structural sub-model which relates endogenous variables to exogenous ones. In the 
peer- influences while models the endogenous models are unobserved the exogenous 
ones are observed. 
2. Latent variables are separated in two groups by the analyst as causal (exogenous) 
variables (ξ) and indicator (endogenous) variables (η). 
These models enable the unobservable variables to take place in the model. The 
software was developed by Jöroskog and Sörbom (2006) and it is still used in social sciences.  
 
2.2.2.5.1. The MIMIC Model 
 
The shadow economy cannot be observed directly so the size of it can only be 
estimated. MIMIC stands for ‘’Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes’’ and it is a special case 
of the general LISREL model. The MIMIC Model has the origins from the factor analysis 
literature of psychometrics. The first application of MIMIC Model on measuring the 
magnitude of the shadow economy was made by Frey and Weck-Hanneman in 1984. They 
used a pooled data set of 17 OECD countries. The application was improved by Aigner, 
Schneider and Ghosh in 1988 by allowing some adjustment in a dynamic MIMIC Model and 
they applied the method for United States. Giles modified the approach as he was using it on 
New Zealand’s hidden economy especially with unit root and cointegration analysis. Also 
Bajada and Schneider (2005) used the approach by analyzing Australia and Pacific nations, 
meanwhile Dell’Anno and Schneider (2003) estimated the shadow economy of Italy and other 
OECD countries.  
The specific case of structural equation models is used, the multiple indicators and 
multiple causes model. These models are constituted by two kinds of equations like the 
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structural and the measurement equations system. The structural model takes the relationship 
between the latent variable (η) and the causes (Xq) and the measurement model links the 
indicators (Xp) and the latent variable.  
In the MIMIC model, shadow economy is the latent variable (η) and is linearly 
determined, subject to a disturbance ζ by a set of observable exogenous causes as; 
 η = γ₁ x₁ + γ₂ x₂ + …….+ γq xq + ζ      (1)  
Latent variable η  linearly determines, subject to a disturbances ε₁, ε₂, ……., εp, the set of 
observable indicators as y₁, y₂, …….., yp: 
y₁ = λ₁ η + ε₁  ,  y₂ = λ₂ η + ε₂ , …………….., yp = λp η + εp  (2) 
Structural disturbance ζ and errors ε are normal distributed, independent and the expectation 
of the variables are zero. 
x’ = (x₁, x₂, …, xq)  observable exogenous causes 
γ’ = (γ₁, γ₂, …, γq) structural parameters in the structural model 
y’ = (y₁, y₂, …, yp) observable endogenous indicators 
λ’ = (λ₁, λ₂,…, λp) structural parameters in the measurement model 
ε’ = (ε₁, ε₂,…, εp)  measurement errors 
υ’ = (υ₁, υ₂, …, υp) standard deviations of the measurement errors 
We can rewrite equations (1) and (2) as; 
ηt = γ’ xt + ζt   (3) 
yt = λ ηt + εt   (4).  
E(ζ ε’) = 0 and E(ζ²) = σ² and E( εε‘) = θ². Here, θ(pxp) is the diagonal matrix with υ, shown on 
its diagonal. We can write the reduced form of the function of the observable variables as; 
y = λ ( γ’ x  + ζ ) + ε = Π’ x + v (5) 
So;  
Π = γ λ’ and v = λ ζ + ε 
Expressing the model in terms of covariances shows us; 
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So, the model’s covariance matrix gives; 
 
Σ is a function of parameters. λ, γ and the covariances contained in Φ, θε    and ψ. The latent 
variable is not observable so, it’s size is unknown. Therefore the model’s parameters must be 
estimated by using the links between the variances of the observed variables and the 
covariances. The purpose of the procedure is to find the values of the parameters and 
covariances that produce an estimate for Σ. 
 
Figure 2.2.General Structure of a MIMIC Model 
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   Figure 2.3. Hypothesizes Relationships in the MIMIC Model 
 
Most analyses of the shadow economy come to the conclusion that tax and social 
security burdens and the intensity of regulation are the two main causes affecting the size and 
development of the shadow economy. Taxes affect labor-leisure choices and stimulate labor 
supply in the shadow economy since the greater the difference between the total cost of labor 
in the official economy and the after-tax earnings from work, the greater the incentive to 
avoid this difference and to work in the shadow economy. An increase in the intensity of 
regulations, such as trade barriers and labor restrictions for foreigners, reduces the freedom 
(of choice) for individuals engaged in the official economy and leads to a substantial increase 
in labor costs in the official economy. Since most of these costs can be shifted onto 
employees, there is further incentive to work in the shadow economy – where they can be 
avoided. 
Unemployment and the hours worked per employee in the official economy also affect 
the shadow economy. While it is clear that a reduction in working hours in the official 
economy increases hours spent working in the shadow economy, unemployment’s effect on 
the shadow economy is ambiguous. 
Another variable we use in measuring the shadow economy with the MIMIC Model is 
the inflation rate based on the consumer price index. First of all, inflation distorts the price 
mechanism by making it difficult to separate varies in relative prices from varies in the 
general level and creates uncertainty. Consequently, there may be redistribution over where 
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resources and production are cheaper.35 So, the inflation rate becomes the suspect as the 
consumer basket of goods and services which is CPİ is calculated may not sufficiently cover 
up the items that consumers have to buy from the unofficial markets at lower prices.36 
The lower the officially measured GDP, the fewer possibilities people have to earn 
money in the official economy, and the likelier they are to be driven into the shadow 
economy. In the short run, we expect this negative relationship to exist. In the long run, 
however, the official and the shadow economy are complements rather than substitutes, and 
the variables will thus exhibit a positive relationship. 
The application of the MIMIC model also has its critiques. Helberger and Knepel 
(1988) show that the leading conclusions of Frey and Weck-Hannemann are not constant in 
the face of small changes in either the data period or the group of countries taking place in the 
study. They also argue that the lists of causal and indicator variables are unpersuasive for the 
purpose. Smith (2002) and Hill (2002) criticize the modeling in the Giles and Tedds book, 
especially the absence of economic theory to guide the specification and the complexity of the 
estimation strategy. In the critique of Helberger and Knepel, they also examine the relevance 
of the causal and indicator variables that are used. The specification and conclusions of Giles 
and Tedds are examined in Breusch (2005a), where it is shown that the time path of their 
estimate for Canada has little to do with any underground activity, but mostly reflects price 
inflation and real growth in the observed economy. Moreover, the level of their estimate is a 
numerical accident with no connection to any evidence in the data.37 
Indicators of the MIMIC Model  
Activities in shadow economy have the effect on the official sector through their effect 
on the production, capital and labor markets. These factors are able to obtain the changes in 
the size of the unofficial economy relative to the official economy. In MIMIC model we 
include monetary indicators (Y1) (which is the ratio of narrow money to broad money), 
formal economic production (Y2) (measured by the Real GDP) and the work force 
participation rates (Y3).   
In terms of monetary indicators, most transactions in the shadow economy come about 
as cash. However an increase in shadow economy would increase the demand for cash.  
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37 T. Breusch, ‘Estimating the Underground Economy using MIMIC Models’,School of Economics, Faculty of 
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In terms of the work force, as the size of the shadow economy increases, that would 
occur as a decrease in the formal labor force participation rates. As the work force in shadow 
economy increases, the number of people who work in the formal economy decreases. There 
would also be an decrease in working hours in official economy. 
In terms of the product market, growth of the shadow economy encourages the 
movement of inputs from the formal to the informal sector. However this situation would 
depress the productivity in the formal sector, which is measured by the official growth rate. 
As the production in the shadow economy increases would reflect the official growth rate as 
well. This is because during a recession, inputs such as labor and capital move out from the 
formal economy into the shadow economy. Thus we can say that there is an inverse relation 
between official and shadow economy.  From the other point of view, some economists claim 
that formal economy causes growth in the shadow economy. This may occur in economies 
with the significant linkages between the official and shadow economy. For example In 
Nigeria, the presence of forward linkages in which certain aspects of production in the formal 
economy are subcontracted to the SE. Thus an increase in official growth rate increases the 
relative size of the SE as a result of increased demand for goods and services decrease in the 
growth of the shades by firms in the formal economy.  A recession in the growth of the formal 
economy would lead also lead to a reduction in the growth of the shadow economy. The 
results show the existence of a direct linkage between the sizes of formal and shadow 
economy. Schneider and Klingmair find a pro-cyclical relationship between activity in the 
legitimate and underground economy for developed countries but countercyclical for 
developing economies.  Although several comparative and single country studies have shown 
significant findings, they have not been able to provide absolute results on the relationship 
between official to shadow economy. 
 
2.3. Studies for Estimation of the Shadow Economy in the World 
 
Defining the shadow economy as an international case was coincided the beginning of 
the 1980’s. In 1983 an international conference was organized to constitute a general rules 
associated with definitional issues of concept of shadow economy. The joint decision of this 
conference is: The shadow economy comprises a large part of the world economy and 
subjects a danger for the international accounts.  
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The first scientific study was the article which Gutmann examined the shadow 
economy of U.S.A.  
 
2.3.1. Estimation Shadow Economy in Developed Countries 
 
Analyzing of the U.S. economy Gutmann (1977) has estimated the share of the size of 
the shadow economy in official national income 176 billion dollars in 1976 and 195 billion 
dollars in 1977. Another survey in 1981 he has indicated the size of the shadow economy 
constituted 15% of national income.  
Schneider (1997) has observed in econometric estimations using the currency demand 
and MIMIC approach that especially between 1970 and 1990 the shadow economy in West 
European Countries is increased. In 1990 the share of the shadow economy in total GDP in 
OECD countries was %10. Also in 1994, the estimated of the size of the shadow economy in 
17 OECD countries is shown that the share of the size of the shadow economy in GDP was 
around %15 and the share of Canada were too close to the international average. The analysis 
estimated by Schneider (1997) point that the basic causes of the shadow economy consist of 
direct and indirect tax burden and the density of government regulations. 
In order to estimate the shadow economy in Canada Tedds (1997) applied in his 
survey the MIMIC model in which the shadow economy is defined as a latent variable. 
MIMIC model contains causal and indicator variables to estimate the size of the shadow 
economy 1960/1995 periods. Accordingly, the size of the shadow economy covered about 
15% of GDP in 1995. 
Giles (1999) has concentrated his researches on New Zealand. He estimated the size of 
the shadow economy using both MIMIC and currency demand model. The estimated latent 
variable method is used to create the times series index of the shadow economic activities 
calculated by the results of the currency demand approach.38 The size of the shadow economy 
in New Zealand is between 6.8% and 11.3% of the GDP in periods 1968/1994. 
Giles and Tedds have made in a study published in 2000 a comparison of the shadow 
economy between Canada and New Zealand; and for this comparison the MIMIC approach is 
                                                             
38 Nüket Kırcı ,“Türkiye’de Kayıt Dışı Ekonominin Tahmini: Ekonometrik Bir Yaklaşım” ,Master Thesis 
(2006),p.7 
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applied. In this study they examined the effect of the taxes between 1986-1991 on the shadow 
economy in Canada and New Zealand.  
Bhattacharya estimated in his study published in 2000 the shadow economy using the 
econometric method in U.K. for the period 1960-1984. The share of the shadow economy in 
GDP was 3.8% in 1960 and 8% in 1984. Unlike the method of Tanzi, he has not included the 
tax variables. This method has an advantage testing tax evasion theory.  
Table 2.2. The Size of the Shadow Economy in Developed Countries 
Coun/Yea           1960     1978 89/90    90/93     94/95    96/97    99/00   2000/01   2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 
Sweden                5.4 13.2 15.8 17.0 18.6 19.5 19.2 19.1 18.3 17.9 17.5 
Belgium               4.7 12.1 19.3 20.8 21.5       22.2       22.2        22.0       21.0       20.5 20.1 
Denmark 3.7 11.8 10.8 15.0 17.8 18.2  18.0 17.9       17.3 16.9 16.5 
İtaly  4.4 11.4 22.8 24.0 26.0  27.2 27.1 27.0 25.7 25.1       24.4 
N.lands               5.6 9.6 11.9 12.7 13.7  13.8 13.1 13.0 12.6 12.3 12.0 
France   5.0 9.4  9.0 13.8 14.5 14.8 15.2 15.0 14.5 14.2 13.8 
Norway  4.4 9.2 14.8 16.7 18.2 19.4 19.1 19.0 18.4 17.9 17.6 
Austria  4.6 8.9 5.1 6.1 7.0 8.6 9.8 10.6 10.9 10.6 10.3 
Canada  5.1 8.7 12.8 13.5 14.8 14.9 16.0 15.8 15.2 14.8 14.3 
Germany 3.7 8.6 11.8 12.5 13.5 14.8 16.0 16.3 16.8 16.3 15.6 
U.S.A  6.4 8.3 6.7  8.2  9.2  8.8  8.7  8.7  8.4  8.3  8.2 
U.K   4.6 8.0  9.6  11.2  12.5  13.0  12.7  12.5  12.2  12.1  12.0 
Finland  3.1  7.6  -  -     -  -  18.1  18.0  17.4  17.0  16.6 
Irland   1.7  7.2  11.0  14.2  15.4  16.0  15.9  15.7  15.3  15.0  14.8 
Spain  2.6  6.5 16.1 17.3 22.4 23.0 22.7 22.5 22.0 21.6 21.3 
S.land  1.1  4.3  6.7  6.9  6.7  7.8  8.6  9.4  9.4  9.2  9.0 
Japan  2.0  4.1  -  -  10.6  11.3  11.2  11.1  10.8  10.5  10.3 
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Greece    -  -   -  27.2  29.6  30.1  28.7  28.5  28.2  27.9  27.6 
Australia  -  -  10.1  13.0  13.8  13.9  14.3  14.1  13.5  12.8  12.6 
N.Zeland  -  -  9.2  9.0  11.3  -  12.8  12.6  12.3  12.0  11.7 
Portugal   -  -  15. 6 2 2.1  22.8  22.7  22.5  21.9  21.4  21.2 
Average (%)    4.2 8.8  12.0  14.5  16.0  16.8  16.8  16.7  16.2  15.8  15.6 
Source: Schneider 2003,2004,2005 
 
Examined the table generally, it is observed the volume of the shadow economy 
increased starting with 4.2% in 1960 until the period of 1999/2000, after this period it started 
to decrease. Considering the average of OECD countries it is seemed that Switzerland has the 
lowest average unlike Greece. Grease is followed by Italy, Portugal, Belgium and Spain. 
Nevertheless, the average increase of OECD countries is 11.6% in this 45 years period, in 
other words volume of the shadow economy of OECD countries rise 2.7 times in 45 years.39 
 
 
2.3.2. Estimation Shadow Economy in Transition Countries 
 
 In Transition countries group is appeared former Soviet Union countries and CEE 
countries. In this group the average volume of shadow economy is 40.1% in 2002/2003. In 
transition countries the country with the highest volume of shadow economy is Georgia with 
68% and the lowest volume of shadow is Czech Republic with 20.1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
39Boyan Belev,, ‘The Informal Economy In the EU Accesion Countries: Size, Scope, Trends and Challenges to 
the of Process of EU Enlargement’, Center for the Study of Democracy, 2003, p:23 
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Table 2.3. The Size of the Shadow Economy in 25 East and Central European and 
Former Soviet Union Countries 
 
Source: Schneider 2005 
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2.3.3. Estimation Shadow Economy in Developing Countries 
 
There exist 86 countries in the group of developing countries including 37 African countries, 
28 Asian countries, 21 Central and South American countries. Some economists believe that 
the shadow economy in developing countries will decrease once these countries achieved 
higher levels of growth and modern development. The informal economy can however no 
longer be considered as a temporary phenomenon. Moreover, the shadow economy has been 
observed to have more of a fixed character in countries where incomes and assets are not 
equally distributed. It seems that if economic growth is not accompanied by improvements in 
employment levels and income distribution, the informal economy does not decrease. The 
situation is therefore that the informal economy is continuously increasing in most developing 
countries, even in rural areas. Estimates show that the non-agricultural employment share of 
the informal workforce is 78% in Africa, 57% in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 45–
85% in Asia40 . In all developing countries, self-employment includes a greater share of 
informal employment than wage employment. Specifically, self-employment represents 70% 
of informal employment in Sub-Saharan Africa, 62% in North Africa, 60% in Latin America 
and 59% in Asia. Consequently, informal wage employment in the developing world 
constitutes 30% to 40% of the informal employment outside of agriculture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
40 K. F. Becker, Fact finding study, ‘The Informal Economy‘, SIDA, (2004), p:8 
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Table 2.4. The Size Of Shadow Economy in 17 African Countries 
 
Source: Schneider 2005 
 
The huge informal economy in Africa is only to some extent an issue of tax burdens 
and regulation, given the simple fact that the limited local economy means that working in the 
shadow economy is often the only way of getting a minimal standard of living. 
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However, it is not possible to treat Asian countries equally because as Israel, Hong 
Kong and Singapore highly developed, countries like Thailand and Nepal, still developing. It 
is somewhat astonishing that the average size of the Asian shadow economies is considerably 
smaller than the shadow economies of African and Latin American states.41   
 
Table 2.5.  The Size of Shadow Economy in 28 Asian Countries  
 
Source: Schneider 2005 
If we take a look at the characteristics of shadow economy in Latin America we can 
make a list that; 
- There is a very high tax burden (direct and indirect taxes as a percentage of GDP) 
                                                             
41 F. Schneider,, ‘Shadow Economies and Corruption All Over the World: New Estimates for 145 Countries‘, 
Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Austria, (2005), p:16 
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- Government interventions do nothing to bring about the improvements in income 
distribution. 
- The markets are excessively regulated by government.42  
Central and South American countries, compared to Africa, the rate of increase in 
shadow economy activity in Central and South America is higher.43 
 
Table 2.6. The Size of Shadow Economy in Central and South American Countries  
 
Source: Schneider 2005 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
42 F. Schneider and  D. Enste, IMF Economic Issues No:30(2002). 
43 F.Schneider, ‘Shadow Economies and Corruption All Over the World: New Estimates for 145 Countries‘, 
Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Austria, (2005), p:16 
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3. CHAPTER  
ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION OF SHADOW ECONOMY IN GERMANY AND 
USA 
 
Most of the approaches used in determining the size of the shadow economy in GDP have 
important contras. If we examine the direct approaches; for example the survey approach, we 
assume that the individuals who play an active role in shadow economic activities, would not 
answer the questions correctly. Thus, we would not expect accomplished conclusions. In the 
integrated approach; the conclusions are also acquired by a survey. Mentioning the tax audit 
and investigation approach, the inspections are centered on the individuals who are registered 
in tax administration. Thus, unregistered activities and individuals are held out of the 
evaluation.  
However, indirect approaches also have important contras in estimating the size of the 
shadow economy. For example, the employment approach is not a reliable method because 
unregistered employees can never be correctly established. Contra of the physical output 
approach is that electricity is not in every shadow economic activity needed and the efficiency 
is changeable over time.  
If we look at basic monetary approach in the monetary approaches, we see that not just 
cash, but also checks or bills are important payment instruments in shadow economic 
activities. One important contra of the trading volume approach is that, it is crucial to 
determine trade volume and it is much like a theoretical approach rather than a practical one.  
Currency Demand Approach and MIMIC Model Approach are the most used methods of 
late years in estimating the size of shadow economy in GDP. The contras of the other 
approaches induce the analysts to use these two more reliable approaches. MIMIC Model is a 
time series estimation model used in measuring the size of the shadow economy and it 
enables the use of multiple indicators. However, MIMIC Model provides a basis for analyses 
in different studies.  
The most important feature of the MIMIC Model is that unlike the explained methods 
above, it uses not only the traces that shadow economy leaves on labor, capital or production 
markets, but all. The MIMIC Model handles the causes like tax burden, inflation, 
unemployment of shadow economy simultaneously in a statistical frame.  
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3.1. Data Analysis 
 
 In our study we try to estimate the Shadow Economy for France and Germany. Our 
data covers the annual between 1990 and 2010: 21 observations. Data sources are summarized 
in Appendix A. In this section it is examined the MIMIC model introduced by Jöroskorg 
(1996) and the variables being used to estimate the model needs to be stationary. In the first 
step, the variables are determined under the null hypothesis against stationary using the 
Augmented Dickey Fuller Test. The results are shown in Table 3.1. The plots of the variable 
are shown in Appendix B. 
Table 3.1: Augmented Dickey Fuller Test for USA 
Variables Incl. 
Equat. 
ADF * Critical 
value** 
First Level ADF* Critical 
Value** 
Indicators       
Circulation of 
currency 
C -3.2398 -3.0655 Circulation of 
currency 
-4.90 -3.0403 
GDP growth rate C -2.8097 -3.02068 GDP growth rate -4.7952 -3.0299 
Causes        
Unemployment 
Rate 
C&T -1.1687 -3.6908 Unemployment 
Rate 
-3.7733 -3.6908 
Taxes on 
production and 
import/GDP 
C&T -3.6864 -3.7104 Taxes on 
production and 
import/GDP 
-4.9921 -3.6736 
Government 
Consumption/GDP 
C -1.9171 -3.0299 Government 
Consumption/GDP 
-3.3219 -3.0521 
Annual working 
hours 
C -0.2680 -3.0206 Annual working 
hours 
-3.8963 -3.0299 
*For ADF Test Statistics we use the Akaike Information Criteria. ** Critic level %5 
 According to the results of ADF Test Statistics for Unites States before estimation of  
the MIMIC model the all variables except Circulation of Currency are differentiated to I(1). 
 
 
 
Table 3.2: Augmented Dickey Fuller Test for Germany 
Variables Incl. 
Equat. 
ADF * Critical 
value** 
First Level ADF* Critical 
Value** 
Indicators       
Labor force  C -0.7091 -3.0299 Labor force -3.2401 -3.0299 
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GDP growth rate C -4.0331 -3.0403 GDP growth rate -3.6117 -3.0810 
Causes        
Tax burden / GDP C&T -1.2084 -3.6736 Tax burden/GDP -4.1759 -3.6908 
Social Security 
Burden/GDP 
C -2.0528 -3.0810 Social Security 
Burden/GDP 
-3.4117 -3.0810 
Government 
Consumption/GDP 
C -1.9431 -3.0299 Government 
Consumption/GDP 
-3.6551 -3.0403 
*For ADF Test Statistics we use the Akaike Information Criteria. ** Critic level %5 
 According to the  table above all variables except GDP growth rate are differentiated to I(1) in 
order to estimate  the size of the shadow economy through MIMIC model. 
 
3.2 Obtaining and Estimation of the Shadow Economy 
 
To measure the Shadow Economy various and different models are considered and in order to 
estimate the model is formed MIMIC 4-1-2 as an illustration for United States. As seen Figure 
3.1 this illustration has 2 indicators and 4 causal variables. The indicators are GDP growth 
and Circulation of Currency. The Causal factors are Total tax over GDP, Taxes on production 
and imports over GDP, Annual working hours and taxes on personal income over GDP. As 
seen Figure 3.2 for Germany MIMIC model is estimated 3-1-2 as an illustration. And this 
illustration has 3 causal and 2 indicators variables. The indicators are GDP growth rate and 
Labor force and the causal variables are Social Security burden over GDP, Tax Burden over 
GDP and Government Consumption over GDP.  
 The prediction equations of the MIMIC model requires normalization of the second 
(measurement) equation in which the dependent variable is latent variable and so one of the 
indicators vectors (λ) is restricted to identify the model.  For that reason the coefficient of the 
Circulation of Currency in estimation of United States and Labor force in Germany is 
restricted to 1. (λ=1) 
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Figure 3.1. Path diagram of the MIMIC Model for United States 
 
 On the purpose of the determination of the Shadow Economy in United States and 
Germany the output belonging to the normalization solution is shown above in order to 
estimate the MIMIC model using LISREL software. 
 For United States according to the solution of the MIMIC model approach, taxes on 
personal income over GDP, tax burden over GDP have a positive relation with the size of the 
shadow economy and unemployment and taxes on production and import over GDP have 
negative relation with the size of the shadow economy. There is a positive relation between 
the size of the shadow economy and both indicator variables.  
 The predicted latent variable, shadow economy, is expressed 86% of the variance of 
the circulation of currency and 56% of the variance of the GDP growth. In other words 86% 
of changes in circulation of currency and 56 % of the GDP growth is explained by the shadow 
economy. GFI (Goodness of Fit) is obtained 0.90 and also NFI (Normed Fit Index) 0.881. The 
indexes which are got the value between 0 and 1 are found close to 1 that is required for a fit 
equilibrium.  
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Figure 3.2. Path diagram of the MIMIC Model for Germany 
For Germany according to the solution of the MIMIC model approach, tax burden 
over GDP has a positive relation with the size of the shadow economy and social security 
burden over GDP and government consumption over GDP have negative relation with the 
size of the shadow economy. There is a positive relation between the size of the shadow 
economy and both indicator variables likewise.  
 The predicted latent variable, shadow economy, is expressed 98.72% of the variance 
of the labor force and 95% of the variance of the GDP growth. In other words 98.72% of 
changes in labor force and 95 % of the GDP growth are explained by the shadow economy. 
GFI (Goodness of Fit) is obtained 0.991 and also NFI (Normed Fit Index) 0.98. These indexes 
show that the equilibrium is good fit.   
In order to estimate the size of the shadow economy in United States the latent 
variable scaled up to a value of the average of the years between 1999 and 2001 in 
Schneider’s studies. This lead we take the average of these studies to measure the size of the 
Shadow Economy for our study. And the base value is the 8,7% for the study. 
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Table 3.3: Size of the Shadow Economy in United States in % of GDP 
YEAR   SE as % of GDP 
USA 
1990  
9,230965 
1991 
9,270135 
1992 
9,192666 
1993 
9,084732 
1994 
8,984632 
1995 
8,92022 
1996 
8,852326 
1997 
8,765283 
1998 
8,704352 
1999 
8,709575 
2000 
8,7 
2001 
8,791396 
2002 
8,921961 
2003 
8,997689 
2004 
8,988114 
2005 
8,984632 
2006 
8,984632 
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The rate of the underground economy in the U.S. has grown significantly since the 
1990s mainly due to increase in currency holding, growth in the private services sector, the 
burdensome procedure to obtain business licenses and pay taxes, and a higher perceived level 
of corruption in public sectors.44 
• Marginal income tax is one of the most important elements in the growth of the 
shadow economy and United States holds the highest marginal income tax in all countries. In 
most countries marginal tax rate is higher than the average tax rate. For example an individual 
may have a marginal tax rate of 45% but pay average tax of half this amount. In USA analysis 
shows that as the personal income tax rate increases 1%, shadow economy tends to increase 
1.4%45. 
•  Illicit employment is one of the most important economic problems of the United 
States. Today, the population of the illegal immigrants is nearly 8.5 million but this not said to 
represent the real number.  
• Also criminal activities are a significant economic problem in analyzing the rate of the 
shadow economy. The costs of the unreported wages are around 50 billion US Dollars to the 
government. 
• Due to research, the unemployment rate had reached 10.2% in October 2010.  
• Entrepreneurs often make quarterly payments of their taxes and the growth of online 
commerce may worsen the situation. 
• Also government policies have an important role in rising of the shadow economy.  
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC) released a report in 2010 concluding that 7.7 
percent of U.S. households, that means around 17 million adults, do not have a bank account. 
                                                             
44M.K. Hassan and S.Y. Jung, ‘A Re-Examination of the US Underground Economy: Size, Estimation and 
Policy Imlications’, Network Financial Institute at Indiana State University, (2010), p:2 
45F. Schneider, ‘Shadow Economy’, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria, (2002), p:5 
2007 
9,012486 
2008 
9,17961 
2009 
9,277969 
2010 
9,258819 
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It is expected that as an economy gets richer the unbanked population should fall.  It is a 
contrary situation what now happens in the USA.46  
• Tax revenues became lower than the real GDP since the recession began.  
• An evident result is that in 8 years from 1999 to 2007 shadow economies appear to be 
on the rise in nearly every country around the world. This is just because taxation and 
regulations have increased in most countries over the past 15 years. 
 
 
                
Figure 3.2. Size of the US Shadow Economy in GDP 
 
To calculate the size of the shadow economy in Germany the latent variable scaled up 
to a value of the year in 1995 that is given in Schneider’s studies. This lead we can take the 
size of the shadow in 1995 which is 13.90 a base value for our study.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
46R.W.Rahn, ‘New Underground Economy’, Giovanni’s World, Dec 9, 2009 
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Table 3.4: Size of the Shadow Economy in Germany in % of GDP 
YEAR   SE as % of GDP 
Germany 
1990  
15,34800585 
1991 
14,62346782 
1992 
14,02093471 
1993 
14,02093471 
1994 
13,9 
1995 
13,9 
1996 
14,32273637 
1997 
14,50360333 
1998 
14,38266862 
1999 
13,95993225 
2000 
13,9 
2001 
14,56353557 
2002 
14,98627194 
2003 
15,34800585 
2004 
15,34800585 
2005 
14,98627194 
2006 
14,62346782 
2007 
14,62346782 
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Shadow economy has been increasing since 2004 because of the mini-job regulation in 
Germany in April 2003 and this regulation obtained of decrease of unemployment in 
Germany in 2005 around 9 billion Euros. It is not uncomplicated to analyze the rather new 
measures for preferable coordination and more efficient process against the shadow economy 
with stricter legislation on fighting the shadow economy introduced in August 2004 
contribute to a reduction of illegal employment. According to the analyses, the new laws 
reduced the illegal activities by 1 billion Euros in 2005. However it is still argued that if a 
stricter legislation is a way of decreasing the shadow economic activities. There are two 
reasons of this argument. First is, it is needed a very high control effort to prevent the shadow 
activities. Second one is, people are often unaware of the new legislation.  
Some reasons of changes of the rates of shadow economy in 2000s; 
 Removal of taxes in year 2007 is the reason of declining of the shadow economy in 
2008. 
 The social insurance has a 5% of increase since July 2006 and this is also a reason of 
declining of the shadow economy. On the other hand, mini-jobs still lead to an 
increase in shadow economy47. The results of the research show us growth of 300 
million Euros. Although the elements we listed above induce a decrease of 100 
million Euros in shadow economy. The coordination of illegal employment activities 
is a significant effect on the level of shadow economy.   
 An increase of 45% income tax induced shadow economy by 0.3 billion Euros in 
2007. 
                                                             
47F. Schneider, ‘Reducing the Shadow Economy in Germany; A Blessing or Curse?’, Johannes Kepler University 
of Linz, Austria, (2007), p:20 
2008 
14,02093471 
2009 
14,02093471 
2010 
10,70218663 
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 Regarding too increase of social insurance contributions levied on “Mini-Jobs” in the 
commercial sector from 25% to 30% coming since 2006, illicit employment increased 
by 2500 to 3500 million Euros.48 
 The decrease of the unemployment insurance increased the size of shadow economy 
by nearly 1.5 billion Euros. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Size of the Germany Shadow Economy in GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
48F. Schneider, ‘Reducing the Shadow Economy in Germany; A Blessing or Curse?’, Johannes Kepler University 
of Linz, Austria, (2007), p:22 
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CONCLUSION 
Shadow economy is a phenomenon of significance in all countries. One of the most 
important problems of creating and implementing the social and economic politics is the 
shadow economy. The causes of the shadow economy can be divided into three main such as 
social, economic and institutional reasons. The tax system is based on the most of the social 
and institutional reasons. Due to resistance to tax, tax awareness, high tax rates and density of 
tax legislation and regulation contributes the development of the shadow economy.   
The informality in the economic system creates several disadvantages. Shadow 
economy has a negative effect on the tax system and making the taxable resources out of 
control of the government and cause public budget deficit through reducing the power and 
effectiveness of tax collection of government. In term of statistically the negative effect of 
shadow economy appears some measurement bias on many of data on level of welfare, 
inflation, employment and account deficit. This situation leads to failure applying the 
economic and social policies. Through some economic and social policies requires correct 
and reliable estimates of the shadow economy to provide using the public resources effective 
and efficient.  
There is a variety reasons why people shift to the shadow economic activities. 
Foremost of engaging in shadow economy appears taxation and regulation. Furthermore a 
government has to analyses the relationships between official and shadow economy to reduce 
the activities in shadow economy among its economic policy decisions.  
In light of some facts in developed countries governments may not have a big interest 
to decrease the activities in shadow economy. Almost 2/3 of the earning in the shadow 
economic activities is spent in the official economy and income earned in shadow economy 
may create a rise the standard of living of working population.  
 In our study it is presented the estimates the shadow economy between the years 1990-
2010 for the Germany and United States. The estimates are made based on currency demand 
and MIMIC Model approaches. The calculations denote that the shadow economy as a 
percentage of GDP has fluctuated between 8% and 10% of GDP for United States and 
between 14% and 16% of GDP for Germany.  
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Appendix A: Sources of Data 
A.1. Sources of Data for United States 
Causes Sources Annotations 
Unemployment Rate OECD The annual data are averages of monthly estimates 
and based on 2000. 
Taxes on production and 
import/GDP 
BEA Table 3.1. Government Current receipts and 
expenditures/ Table 1.1.5.  Gross Domestic Product. 
Annual average working hours OECD In number of hours worked per year person in 
employment. 
Government 
consumption/GDP 
WB Government final expenditure consumption/ Gross 
Domestic Product. 
Indicators   
Circulation of Currency FRED M1/H.6. Money Stock Measures. 
GDP growth rate BEA Table 1.1.1. Percent Change From Preceding Period 
in Gross Domestic Product. 
 
A.2. Sources of Data for Germany 
Causes Sources Annotations 
Social Security Burden/GDP   
Taxes/GDP OECD Revenue statistics- Tax revenue as a % of GDP 
Government consumption/GDP WB Government final expenditure consumption/ Gross 
Domestic Product. 
Indicators   
Labor Force OECD ALFS Summary Satistics 
GDP growth rate WB World Bank Nationals Accounts Data 
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Appendix B: Plots of variables 
B.1. United States variables  
    GDP growth rate                  Circulation of Money 
   
    Government Consumption over GDP     Taxes on production and import over GDP 
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B.2. Germany variables 
GDP growth rate                                                              Labor Force  
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Abstract 
As a serious economic and social problem, shadow economy has begun to be discussed  in 
Europe and United Stated during 1960s and it also became an important problem all over the 
world during 1980s.  
The effects of shadow economy on world economies are the rise of the budget deficits, 
decrease of tax revenues, deprivation of social rights of the workers, the comprise of a 
inequitable competition, reduce of the efficiencies of the fiscal and monetary policies.  
The aim of our study is to exhibit an idea about the shadow economy in two developed 
countries, Germany and United States, and to compare with the extension of shadow economy 
in different developed and developing countries. We also submit different policies about the 
solution of this important economic and social issue.  
In first chapter of the study, a definition of the shadow economy is made, and its interaction 
with the official economy is investigated. In second chapter, in the theoretical background,  
the main causes and the methods for estimating the shadow economy, the size of shadow 
economy in different countries were handled. In the third chapter, we made an estimation of 
shadow economy for Germany and United States with two different approaches which are 
called ‘Currency Demand Approach’ and ‘MIMIC Model Approach’.  
It is necessary to explain the relationship between all causes of the shadow economy to 
acquire the accurate and certain estimates of its size in GDP. With the frame we denoted 
above, it is clear that the shadow economy seems to have positive effect in the short run and 
negative effects in the long run.  
 
Keywords: Shadow Economy, Currency Demand Approach, Structural Equation Models, 
MIMIC Model Approach. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Schattenökonomie begann in den 1960ern in Europa und in den Vereinigten Staaten als ein 
Wirtschaftliches und Soziales Problem zu diskutiert werden. In den 80ern wurde es 
Weltweites Problem. 
Die Wirkungen von Schattenökonomie auf die Weltwirtschaft sind die Aufsteigungen der 
Budgedefizite, Verminderungen der Steuereinnahmen, Entbehrungen der sozialen Rechte der 
Arbeiter, ungerechtes Wettbewerb und die reduzierungen der Effizienz der Fiskal-und 
Geldpolitik. 
Das Ziel unserer Studie ist es, eine Vorstellung über die Schattenökonomie in zwei 
entwickelten Ländern, Deutschland und den Vereinigten Staaten zu zeigen, und mit der 
Erweiterung der Schattenökonomie in verschiedenen Industrie-und Entwicklungsländern zu 
vergleichen. Wir unterbreiten verschiedene Strategien zur Lösung dieser wichtigen 
wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Themen. 
Im ersten Kapitel, eine Definition der Schattenökonomie ist gemacht und seine Interaktion 
mit dem ofiziell Wirtschaft untersucht. Im zweiten Kapitel, in den theoretischen 
Hintergrund, die wichtigsten Ursachen und die Methoden zur Schätzung der 
Schattenwirtschaft und die Größe der Schattenwirtschaft wurden in verschiedenen Ländern 
abgewickelt. Im dritten Kapitel, haben wir einen Estimation der Scahttenwirtschaft für 
Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten mit zwei verschiedenen Methoden, ‘Currency 
Demand Approach‘ und ‘MIMIC Model Approach‘ gemacht.  
Es ist notwendig zu erklären die Beziehung zwischen allen Ursachen der Schattenwirtschaft 
auf die bestimmte Schätzungen um der Größe des BIP zu erwerben . Es ist klar, dass die 
Schattenwirtschaft hat eine positive Wirkung auf kurze Sicht und negative Auswirkungen auf 
lange Sicht. 
 
 
 
 
Schlagwörter: Schattenwirtschaft, Currency Demand Ansatz, Stukturgleichungsmodelle,  
MIMIC-Model-Ansatz. 
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